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Abstract
A fragment of English featuring temporal prepositions and the order-denoting adjectives first and
last is defined by means of a context-free grammar. The phrase-structures which this grammar as-
signs to the sentences it recognizes are viewed as formulas of an interval temporal logic, whose
satisfaction-conditions faithfully represent the meanings of the corresponding English sentences. It
is shown that the satisfiability problem for this logic is NEXPTIME-complete. The computational
complexity of determining logical relationships between English sentences featuring the temporal
constructions in question is thus established.
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1. Introduction
Consider the following sentences:
(1) An interrupt was received during every cycle
(2) The main process ran after the last cycle
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2 I. Pratt-Hartmann / Artificial Intelligence 166 (2005) 1–36(3) While the main process ran, an interrupt was received before loop 1 was executed for
the first time.
These sentences speak of events and their temporal locations: of what happened and when.
The principal devices they employ to encode this information are temporal prepositions
and the adjectives first and last. The aim of this paper is to answer the question: What
is the computational complexity of determining logical relationships between sentences
encoding temporal information using such devices?
This question is of theoretical interest, because the events mentioned in (1)–(3)—cycles,
executions of processes, receipts of interrupts—are extended in time; and temporal logics
which deal with extended events—so-called interval temporal logics—typically exhibit
high computational complexity. Given that the syntax of these logics has little affinity with
that of temporal expressions in English, it is natural to ask whether the meanings of sen-
tences such as (1)–(3) can be captured in a computationally manageable logic. The formal
semantics of temporal constructions in English have been investigated by a succession of
researchers [4,6,12,13,15,20,21]. Yet in none of these accounts are the issues of expressive
power and computational complexity to the fore. Indeed, many treatments of the semantics
of temporal constructions in English represent sentence-meanings in a first-order language
having variables which range over time-intervals and predicates which correspond to event-
types and temporal order-relations—a logic which is easily shown to be undecidable. Given
the recent surge of interest in logical fragments of limited computational complexity, this
situation is unsatisfactory. There are evident practical and theoretical reasons for present-
ing the semantics of natural language constructions, where possible, using formal systems
of limited expressive power.
The plan of this paper is as follows. Section 2 outlines the semantics of the English
temporal constructions considered in this paper. Section 3 then uses a simple context-free
grammar to define a fragment of English featuring these constructions; we call this frag-
ment T PE , short for temporal preposition English. We show how the phrase-structures
assigned to T PE-sentences by this grammar can in fact be viewed as expressions in an
interval temporal logic, which we call T PL. Section 4 presents formal semantics for
T PL. Sections 5 and 6 provide matching upper and lower complexity-bounds for T PL-
satisfiability, showing that this problem is NEXPTIME-complete.
The following terminology and notation will be used throughout. We take a (time) inter-
val to be a closed, bounded, convex (non-empty) subset of the real line. We denote the set
of intervals by I , and we use the (possibly decorated) letters I , J , . . . , as variables rang-
ing over I . Observe that intervals may be punctual. If I and J denote the intervals [a, b]
and [c, d], respectively, with a, b, c, d ∈ R and a  c  d  b, we let the terms init(J, I )
and fin(J, I ) denote the intervals [a, c] and [d, b], respectively. In other words, whenever
J ⊆ I is true, we take init(J, I ) to denote the initial segment of I up to the beginning of
J , and fin(J, I ) to denote the final segment of I from the end of J . More standardly, the
symbol ⊂ always denotes the strict subset relation, and ⊆ the corresponding non-strict re-
lation. Finally, we occasionally employ the definite quantifier ιx(φ,ψ) with the standard
(Russellian) semantics.
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In this section, we consider the semantics of the temporal constructions featured in the
fragment of English defined below—principally, the temporal prepositions. Here, we fol-
low modern usage and count temporal subordinating conjunctions as temporal prepositions
taking clausal (rather than nominal) complements. We defer a formal specification of the
fragment in question to Section 3, and the algorithmic derivation of sentence-meanings to
Section 4.
2.1. Temporal preposition-phrases: basic semantics
Consider the following sentences:
(4) An interrupt was received
(5) An interrupt was received during every cycle
(6) An interrupt was received during every cycle until the main process ran
(7) After the initialization phase, an interrupt was received during every cycle until the main
process ran.
Sentence (4) asserts that, within some contextually specified interval of interest, there is an
interval over which an interrupt was received. Interpreting the unary predicate int-rec so
that it is satisfied by all and only those time intervals over which an interrupt was received,
we may thus represent the meaning of (4) by the formula
(8) ∃J0(int-rec(J0)∧ J0 ⊂ I ).
Notice that the temporal context to which the quantification in (4) is limited is represented
by the free variable I in (8). That is: the meaning of (4) is a temporal abstract, receiv-
ing a truth-value (in an interpretation) only relative to a time interval. Viewing sentence
meanings in this way greatly simplifies the semantics of temporal preposition-phrases.
Sentence (5) asserts that, within the given temporal context, every interval over which a
cycle occurs includes some interval over which an interrupt was received. Interpreting the
unary predicate cyc so that it is satisfied by all and only those time intervals over which a
cycle occurs, we may thus represent the meaning of (5) by the formula
(9) ∀J1(cyc(J1)∧ J1 ⊂ I → ∃J0(int-rec(J0)∧ J0 ⊂J1)).
The normal type in (9) indicates the material contributed by the temporal preposition-
phrase during every cycle, and the light type the material contributed by the sentence An
interrupt was received, which it modifies. Observe that this material in light type is iden-
tical to the formula (8), except that the free temporal context variable has been bound
by a quantifier introduced by the temporal preposition-phrase. On this view, the tempo-
ral preposition-phrase functions semantically as a modal operator, mapping one temporal
abstract to another.
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duced at the end of Section 1, and helping ourselves to a suitable signature of unary
predicates of intervals, we may plausibly represent these sentences’ truth-conditions as,
respectively,
(10) ιJ2(main(J2)∧ J2 ⊂ I,∀J1( cyc(J1)∧ J1 ⊂init(J2, I )→ ∃J0(int-rec(J0)∧ J0 ⊂ J1)))
(11)
ιJ3(init-phase(J3)∧ J3 ⊂ I,
ιJ2(main(J2)∧ J2 ⊂fin(J3, I ),
∀J1(cyc(J1)∧ J1 ⊂ init(J2,fin(J3, I )) →
∃J0(int-rec(J0)∧ J0 ⊂ J1)))).
We pass over the usual issues as to the faithfulness of the Russellian interpretation of
definite quantification (either expressed or implied) in these sentences. Again, the nor-
mal type in (10) and (11) indicates the material contributed by the newly-added temporal
preposition-phrases in (6) and (7) respectively, and the light type the material contributed
by the sentences they modify. Again, this colouring scheme highlights the fact that the
successive temporal preposition phrases function semantically as modal operators, binding
the temporal context variables associated with the sentences they modify. This cascading
quantification, typical of iterated temporal preposition phrases, was pointed out in [18],
and is discussed further in [25].
The fragment of temporal English considered here deals only with events, as opposed
to states—that is, only with telic as opposed to atelic eventualities ([22]; see [19] for an
extended discussion). The thesis that all simple, event-reporting sentences are implicitly
existentially quantified was proposed in [5], and is defended in [17]. These authors take
the quantification in question to be over events rather than time intervals; but this issue
may be ignored for present purposes. A recent collection of papers on this topic can be
found in [10]. One could doubtless quibble about whether the ⊂ in (8)–(11) should be ⊆;
however, the operative concepts seem too vague for this issue to admit of resolution.
We drew attention above to the fact that the formulas (8)–(11) feature a free variable
representing a temporal context. This naturally suggests an alternative representation using
a propositional modal logic in which formulas are evaluated relative to time-intervals, and
event-types are represented by propositional variables. Suppose, for example, such a logic
features the modal operator 〈D〉, where 〈D〉φ is taken to be true at an interval of evaluation
I if and only if, for some proper subinterval J of I , φ is true at J ; and let [D] be the modal
dual of 〈D〉. Then the 1-place first-order formulas (8) and (9) can be equivalently—and
more compactly—re-written as the propositional modal formulas
(12) 〈D〉int-rec
(13) [D](cyc → 〈D〉int-rec).
It is obvious that, with the aid of appropriate modal operators, formulas (10) and (11) could
be treated analogously.
Several such logics have in fact been proposed in the literature, of which the best-
known are the systems usually referred to as CDT [24] and HS ([9]; see also [23]). The
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and the logic HS is in turn strictly less expressive than CDT. Despite its æsthetic ap-
peal, however, a reformulation along the lines of (12)–(13) yields no useful information on
the computational complexity of the logic generated by temporal constructions in natural
language. Halpern and Shoham [9] showed thatHS is undecidable over all interesting tem-
poral flows; and still very little is known about its decidable fragments. (For a discussion,
see [8].) In fact, the most commonly encountered way to ensure decidability for modal
interval temporal logics is to impose the restriction that the proposition-letters represent
point-events. This move leads naturally to various well-known systems, for example, those
of [3,14,16]. While these logics are of considerable theoretical interest in their own right,
they are of little use for representing the meanings of temporal constructions in natural
language.
One striking characteristic of formulas (8)–(11) is the ‘quasi-guarded’ nature of the
quantification they feature. Thus, for example, (8) existentially quantifies over intervals
satisfying the predicate int-rec; likewise, (9) universally quantifies over intervals satisfying
the predicate cyc; and so on. By contrast, the modal operator 〈D〉 suggested above (and
its dual) quantify over all proper subintervals of the current interval of evaluation with-
out restriction; corresponding remarks apply to all the modal operators of CDT and HS:
they lack the ‘quasi-guarded’ character of formulas (8)–(11). It is precisely this feature
which we shall exploit in our search for a computationally manageable logic to capture the
meanings of temporal expressions in English.
2.2. Complications
It is impossible, within the space of a few pages, to do full justice to the complexities
of the English constructions featured in this paper. Nevertheless, some elaboration of the
foregoing account is required; we confine ourselves to those features of greatest relevance
to the ensuing computational analysis. For a comprehensive guide to the grammar of Eng-
lish prepositions, see [11, Chapter 7]; for an account of the English temporal prepositions
in particular, see, e.g., [1].
We begin with some remarks on the temporal preposition before. We take the sentence
(14) An interrupt was received before the main process ran
to be true in a temporal context I when there is a unique running of the main process
during I , and an interrupt is received over some subinterval of I prior thereto. Ordinary
usage is vague as to whether it is the beginning- or end-times of the events in question that
are being compared. To resolve any uncertainty, we simply take (14) to require that some
interrupt-event finished before the run of the main process began. We therefore propose to
render the meaning of (14) by
(15) ιJ1(main(J1)∧ J1 ⊂ I, ∃J0(int-rec(J0)∧ J0 ⊂ init(J1, I ))).
Notice that these truth-conditions impose no limit on how long before the running of the
main process the interrupt was received (except that imposed by the temporal context I ).
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is taken to mean just before or shortly before (The tablets are to be taken before dinner).
This latter sense reflects the possibility of adding a time-measure as a specifier, as in the
phrase five minutes before. In this paper, we ignore this latter sense of before entirely:
incorporating it into our account would involve us in a discussion of either vagueness or
the semantics of temporal measure-phrases, both of which we choose to avoid.
Actually, the previous paragraph is misleading in glossing the sense of before assumed
here as some time before. For the existential quantification in the meaning (15) of (14) is not
provided by the before-phrase at all, but rather by the sentence An interrupt was received
occurring in its scope; the before-phrase serves merely to specify a temporal context to
which that quantification is restricted. In fact, there is no reason this quantification need be
existential at all, thus:
(16) An interrupt was received during every cycle before the main process ran.
We take (16) to have the meaning (10); that is, we take it to be (truth-conditionally) synony-
mous with (6). Here again, the before-phrase in (16) serves merely to identify a temporal
context to which the quantification in its scope is restricted; in particular, it provides no
universal quantification of its own.
As for before, so for until: until-phrases serve only to create temporal contexts restrict-
ing the quantification provided by the sentences in their scope; but they do not provide that
quantification. This is most apparent by considering the pair of sentences (5) and (6), where
the universal quantification evidently arises from the determiner every. This treatment of
until may surprise readers familiar with so-called until-operators in temporal logic, whose
semantics do typically contribute universal quantification. Apparently, there is an associa-
tion of until with universal quantification, at least in the minds of temporal logicians; and
it is natural to ask how this apparent association can be reconciled with the view adopted
here.
The answer is as follows. Sentence (5), which the until-phrase in sentence (6) modifies,
is downward monotonic: if it is true over some interval I , then it is also true over all
subintervals of I . (Downward monotonicity is, of course, characteristic of sentences which
universally quantify over subintervals.) It transpires that until-phrases require a downward-
monotonic scope, as witnessed by the anomalous
(17) ? An interrupt was received until the main process ran
(18) ? An interrupt was received during some cycle until the main process ran.
Thus, on our account, the universal quantification—or more accurately, downward
monotonicity—is not provided by until; but the presence of until requires it to be pro-
vided by something else. Before imposes no such requirement, as we have seen. Thus, the
difference between before (in the sense adopted here) and until lies not in their contribution
to truth-conditions, but merely in the situations in which they can be used. Actually, down-
ward monotonicity is not always sufficient for applicability of until-phrases (see, e.g., [26]).
The exploration of this issue—and indeed of the myriad other differences between before
and until—lies outside the scope of the present enquiry. We note in passing that until, like
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must clearly denote an event or a time:
(19) An interrupt was received during every cycle until 5 o’clock/the first execution of the
main process
(20) ? An interrupt was received during every cycle until the main process.
The preposition when creates another sort of difficulty. When serves primarily to indi-
cate proximity between the events identified in its scope and complement, thus:
(21) An interrupt was received when the main process ran.
Sentences such as (21) in fact impose remarkably loose constraints on the temporal relation
between the events in question, as various writers have noted. But whatever the final verdict
on the nature of those constraints, we cannot usefully treat the associated vagueness in
the present paper, and some further regimentation is necessary. To simplify matters, we
treat (21) as synonymous with
(22) An interrupt was received while the main process ran,
and give it the semantics
(23) ιJ1(main(J1)∧ J1 ⊂ I, ∃J0(int-rec(J0)∧ J0 ⊂ J1)).
Our excuse for doing so is simply that inclusion is an easier relation to work with than
approximate collocation. Readers who find this expedient too brutal can simply omit when
from our fragment.
We have so far discussed quantification in the scope of temporal prepositions; we now
move to the issue of quantification in their complements. Nominal complements of tempo-
ral prepositions typically include determiners; and these determiners contribute quantifi-
cation to the meanings of sentences containing them. This is evident, for example, with
the occurrences of during every cycle in (5)–(7), which contribute the universal quantifiers
in (9)–(11).
Clausal complements of temporal prepositions, by contrast, typically lack an overt quan-
tifier; and the question therefore arises as to how the variables in these complements get
quantified. The answer is that they are (almost always) definitely quantified—i.e. bound by
an ι-operator. Thus, until the main process ran in (6) is interpreted as until the unique time
over which the main process ran, as reflected by the ι-operator in (10). It may seem harsh
to count (6) as false if there are two runs of the main process within the temporal context;
it would perhaps be fairer to interpret the relevant until-phrase as picking out the period
before the first time over which the main process ran. But since this facility is available in
our fragment anyway, as discussed in Section 2.3, the issue need not detain us.
The obvious exception to the rule that temporal prepositions interpret their clausal com-
plements as definitely quantified is whenever. Thus, we take
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to have the truth-conditions
(25) ∀J1(main(J1)∧ J1 ⊂ I → ∃J0(int-rec(J0)∧ J0 ⊂ J1)).
That is: the variable contributed by the complement of the whenever-phrase is universally
quantified. In the sequel, we shall assume that all quantification in clausal complements
of temporal prepositions is definite, except in the case of whenever, where is it universal.
Note that we are mimicking our earlier discussion of when in again taking the operative
temporal relation here to be inclusion rather than approximate collocation. As before, this
represents a certain deviation from ordinary usage; again, however, we cannot sensibly deal
with vague truth-conditions here, and so we pass over the issue.
Some temporal prepositions have been conspicuous by their absence from the forego-
ing discussion. The temporal prepositions on and in, in phrases such as on Mondays or
in January, are specific to certain categories of complements, but are otherwise equiva-
lent to during. Since this detail clearly has no logical significance, we ignore these uses
of in and on, and confine our attention to during. The preposition at, which in Eng-
lish is used in conjunction with clock-times (and some religious festivals) may also fall
into this category, though there are further complications here concerning its inherent ap-
proximateness. The prepositions for and in, in phrases such as for/in five minutes, take as
complements temporal measure-phrases. These lie outside the scope of the logic consid-
ered here.
The preposition by, in its temporal sense, functions analogously to until, except that it
prefers upward-monotonic sentences in its scope; moreover, like until, it dislikes comple-
ments which are not explicitly temporal, thus:
(26) An interrupt was received by 5 o’clock
(27) ? An interrupt was received by the first cycle.
(Note that (37) has a perfectly natural reading in which by is interpreted non-temporally.)
In addition, by exhibits interesting interactions with aspect:
(28) The main process ran/had run/was running by 5 o’clock.
Finally, we observe that by occurs frequently in the construction by the time . . . with a
clausal complement, again with the same preference for qualifying upward-monotonic sen-
tences. Dealing with the rather difficult behaviour of by in our fragment would complicate
the grammar without adding anything of logical interest, and so we ignore it.
In some respects, the mirror-image of both until and by is since:
(29) An interrupt has been received since the main process ran
(30) An interrupt has been received during every cycle since the main process ran.
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aspect.) Unlike until and by, however, since resists embedding in contexts established by
quantification, as we see by comparing
(31) During every cycle, an interrupt did not occur until the main process ran
(32) ? During every cycle, an interrupt has/had not occurred since the main process ran.
Because of these complications, we do not include since in our fragment. However, we do
include after, which we take (again, ignoring some linguistic subtleties) to function as a
mirror image of before. Given the inclusion of after, our omission of since does not affect
the fragment’s (truth-conditional) expressive power.
2.3. First and last
Our fragment will also contain sentences such as
(33) An interrupt was received during the first cycle
(34) An interrupt was received before the main process ran for the last time.
Suppose that, in the relevant temporal context I , there is an unambiguously first cycle:
that is, a cycle which begins and ends before all the others. Then (33) asserts that, if J is the
interval over which this cycle occurs, then an interrupt was received over some subinterval
of J . A corresponding account can of course be given for (34). Problems arise, however,
when there is no unambiguously first cycle within I . Suppose, for example, cycles occur
during intervals J1, J2, and nowhere else, in either of the following arrangements. (In such
diagrams, left-to-right arrangement depicts temporal order; vertical arrangement has no
significance.)
I
cycle
J1
cycle
J2
I
cycle
J2
cycle
J1
It is unclear what the truth-value of (33) should be in such cases. Apparently, we need to
legislate.
We take the mathematically simplest way out. Since we may assume that only finitely
many events of any given type e occur within a given interval I , we proceed as follows. Let
J be the collection of all proper subintervals of I over which an event of type e occurs,
and assume J is nonempty. Since J is by hypothesis finite, we can select the (non-empty)
subset J ′ whose elements have the (unique) earliest end-point. Now select the unique
element J ∈ J ′ whose start-point is latest. Thus, J is the smallest of the earliest-ending
proper subintervals of I over which an e-event occurs. In the sequel, then, we interpret the
phrase the first e, within a temporal context I , to pick out this interval. (In the situations
depicted above, these are the intervals marked J1.) Similarly, we interpret the phrase the
last e, within a temporal context I including at least one occurrence of e, to pick out the
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re-iterate, we are simply legislating here in the most convenient way in cases where native-
speaker intuition returns no clear verdict; if readers prefer to say that the relevant sentences
lack truth-values in such cases, then the results obtained below apply unproblematically.
The only point at which we appeal to this legislation is in Lemma 3 of Section 5.
3. A fragment of temporal English
The task of this section is to define a fragment of temporal English. We do this by
writing a context-free grammar to recognize its sentences. The grammar assigns phrase-
structures to these sentences in the familiar way, and we shall see that, following some
cosmetic re-arrangement, the phrase-structures in question can be regarded as formulas of
the temporal logic T PL defined in Section 4.
3.1. Delineating the fragment
We begin with the simplest sentences in our fragment:
(35) An interrupt was received
(36) An interrupt was not received.
For present purposes, sentence (35) is taken as atomic: that is, we ignore its internal struc-
ture. Accordingly we treat such sentences as vocabulary items, of class S0, and write the
grammar rules:
S → S0 S0 → an interrupt was received/int-rec.
Moreover, the only property of sentence (36) which concerns us is its relation to (35): that
is, we wish to ignore other aspects of its structure. Accordingly, we pretend that (36) is
obtained by simply prefixing the word not to (35), and write the grammar rules
S → Neg,S0 Neg → not/¬.
This expedient removes needless clutter from our grammar, while affecting nothing of
logical substance. (It is a simple exercise to restore the clutter.) Thus, our grammar assigns
to (35) and (36) the phrase-structures shown in Fig. 1. These diagrams feature the symbols
int-rec and ¬, as specified in the grammar rules. These symbols are simply mnemonics for
the corresponding vocabulary items, which will be used later.
Temporal prepositions with nominal complements belong in our grammar to the cate-
gory PN, and occur in phrases such as
(37) during every cycle
(38) after the initialization phase
(39) before the first interrupt.
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Nominal expressions such as cycle, initialization phase and interrupt are taken to be of
(lexical) category N0 and to denote event-types in the same way as items of category S0.
Again, we regard them as structureless:
N0 → cycle/cyc N0 → initialization phase/init N0 → interrupt/int-rec.
We allow these expressions to be optionally modified (once) by the order-specifying ad-
jectives first and last, resulting in a phrase which in turn combines with a determiner to
produce the complement of a temporal preposition. Accordingly, we write the grammar
rules
PP → PN,D , NPD NPD → DetD , N1D N1D → N0
N1! → OAdj, N0 OAdj → first/f OAdj → last/l
Det∀ → every/[ ] Det∃ → some/〈 〉 Det! → the/{ }
PN,D → during/= PN,! → after/> PN,! → before/<,
where the variable subscript D in the above rules ranges over the set of tags {∀,∃, !}. Thus,
our grammar assigns to (37)–(39) the respective phrase-structures shown in Fig. 2. As
before, we have augmented terminal nodes with the corresponding mnemonics to the right
of the obliques in the lexicon.
The tags {∀,∃, !} simply indicate a subcategorization of NP, Det, N1 and PN. This sub-
categorization restricts the use of determiners in two ways. First, it requires that phrases
involving first and last only ever combine with the definite article. This requirement reflects
the observation that (outside university mathematics departments) locutions such as during
a first interrupt and during every first interrupt are anomalous.
Our second restriction on the use of determiners requires that complements of the tem-
poral prepositions until, before and after also incorporate the definite article. For until, this
requirement serves to rule out some clearly anomalous sentences (it is the italicized every
which causes the problem):
(40) ? An interrupt occurred during every cycle until every reset point.
For before and after, the requirement reflects our earlier decision to interpret before in the
sense of some time before, rather than shortly before. To see why, note that common usage
(again: professional mathematicians excepted) does not take the sentences
(41) An interrupt was received before every reset point
(42) An interrupt was received before the first reset point
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to be equivalent in contexts where there is a unique first reset point, as our assumed sense
of before would require. We conclude that the term before can only have the shortly-before
sense in (41), and so we banish that sentence from our fragment. Admittedly, existentially
quantified complements with these prepositions sound better, even with our chosen sense
of before:
(43) An interrupt occurred before some reset point
(44) An interrupt occurred during every cycle until some reset point.
Indeed, such sentences could be admitted into our fragment without compromising the
complexity-theoretic results derived below. However, banning sentences such as (41) while
admitting those such as (43) would generate a logical fragment not fully closed under
negation; and, while such fragments are unproblematic in principle, they tend to make
for notational and conceptual clutter. For simplicity, therefore, we duck the issue, and
simply decree that these temporal prepositions require complements with the definite arti-
cle.
Temporal prepositions with clausal complements belong in our grammar to the category
PS, and occur in phrases such as
(45) before the main process ran
(46) whenever the main process ran
(47) while the main process ran for the last time.
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Unmodified clausal complements are taken to be atomic, again of category S0. Our gram-
mar permits modification (once) of these clausal complements by the adverbials for the
first/last time, analogous to the modification of nominal complements by the adjectives
first/last. Accordingly, we write the grammar rules
PP → PS,D , S1D PS,! → while/(=, { }) OAdv → for the first time/f
S1! → S0, OAdv PS,! → before/(<, { }) OAdv → for the last time/l
S1D → S0 PS,∀ → whenever/(=, [ ]),
thus assigning to (45)–(47) the respective phrase-structures shown in Fig. 3. Recall that
whenever is associated with universal, rather than definite, quantification of its comple-
ment. That is why the grammar rule for whenever incorporates the bracket-pair [ ], rather
than { }, to the right of the oblique. The motivation for these mnemonics will be revealed
in Section 4.
We allow that expressions of categories S0 and N0 may correspond to the same event-
type, as indicated by the mnemonics in the lexicon, thus:
S0 → the main process ran/main N0 → run of the main process/main.
Since we want to finesse issues of subsentential and subnominal structure, we leave it to
grammar-writers’ common sense to spot such nominalizations where they occur. The task
of providing a more complex grammar to automate this job is independent of the issues
addressed here.
Finally, we have grammar rules to adjoin preposition-phrases to sentences and to handle
sentence coordination using and and or. There are no surprises here:
S → S,PP S → S,Conj,S Conj → and/∧ Conj → or/∨ .
Fig. 4 shows the phrase-structures of Sentences (4)–(6). Our grammar takes no account
of fronted preposition-phrases, as illustrated, for example, by Sentence (7). It is obvious
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that this defect can easily be rectified. This completes our explanation of the fragment of
English studied in this paper. We dub this fragment T PE , short for temporal preposition
English; the full list of grammar rules is given in Appendix A.
3.2. Re-writing phrase-structures
In Section 4, we show how phrase-structures in T PE can be treated as formulas in a
language for which a recursive semantics can be given in the style due to Tarski. Moreover,
the satisfaction-conditions thus associated with T PE-sentences convincingly systematize
the meanings proposed for the various examples considered in Section 2. To facilitate
the presentation, we first subject T PE phrase-structures to some minor geometrical re-
arrangement, which we now proceed to describe. We have three base cases and three
recursive cases to consider.
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compactly as follows:
S
S0
e
⇒ 〈e〉=
S
Neg S0
¬ e
⇒ ¬〈e〉=.
(Here and in the sequel, we have replaced all terminal nodes with the mnemonics to the
right of the obliques: this simply unclutters the diagrams.)
Second base case: Any structure of category N1 will be re-written more compactly as
follows:
N1D
N0
e
⇒ e
N1!
OAdj N0
f e
⇒ ef
N1!
OAdj N0
l e
⇒ el .
Third base case: Any structure of category S1 will be re-written analogously:
S1D
S0
e
⇒ e
S1!
S0 OAdv
e f
⇒ ef
S1!
S0 OAdv
e l
⇒ el .
First recursive case: Consider a structure of category S immediately dominating a struc-
ture ∆ of category S and a PP with a nominal complement Γ . Assuming that we already
know how to re-write ∆ and Γ , such a structure will be re-written more compactly as
follows:
S
S:∆ PP
PN,D NPD
τ DetD N1D:Γ
‖ ‖
⇒ ‖α‖τψ if Γ ⇒ α and ∆ ⇒ ψ ,
where ‖ ‖ denotes any of the bracket-pairs 〈 〉, [ ] or { }, and τ any of the symbols <, > or
=.
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structure ∆ of category S and a PP with a clausal complement Γ . Assuming that we already
know how to re-write ∆ and Γ , such a structure will be re-written more compactly as
follows:
S
S:∆ PP
PS,D S1D:Γ
(τ,‖ ‖)
⇒ ‖α‖τψ if Γ ⇒ α and ∆ ⇒ ψ ,
where ‖ ‖ denotes either of the bracket-pairs [ ] or { }, and τ any of the symbols <, > or
=.
Third recursive case: Any structure of category S immediately dominating a node of
category Conj will be re-written more compactly as an expression with major connectives
∧ or ∨ in the obvious way. The details are routine and are left to the reader to spell out
formally.
Consider, for example, the phrase-structures of the T PE-sentences (4)–(6), as drawn in
Fig. 4. Re-writing these phrase-structures yields the respective expressions
〈int-rec〉=, [cyc]=〈int-rec〉=, {main}<[cyc]=〈int-rec〉=.
Apart from some unusual brackets and decorations, which will be explained later, the re-
sults of this re-arrangement look remarkably like formulas of propositional dynamic logic,
with the event-classifying mnemonics occupying the place of atomic programs. So they
look; and so they are. We shall give a standard account of the semantics of these formulas
along the lines of the usual semantics for propositional dynamic logic. We stress (though it
is obvious) that no information has been created or destroyed in the above re-arrangement
process: it is a simple graphical matter of replacing an unfamiliar arboreal typography with
a familiar (and more compact) linear one. We could have stuck with trees if we had really
wanted.
There is one further round of simplification before we proceed. We have demonstrated
how PPs in the fragment T PE can be regarded (syntactically) as modal operators of the
form ‖α‖τ , where α is an expression of one of the forms e, ef or el , ‖ ‖ is one of 〈 〉,
[ ] or { }, and τ is one of =, < or >. However, our grammar imposes restrictions on the
quantification in PP-complements ensuring that, if τ ∈ {<,>} or if α has one of the forms
ef , el , then ‖ ‖ is { }. This cuts down the set of modal operators to the forms
〈e〉=, [e]=, {e}=, {e}τ , {eσ }=, {eσ }τ ,
where e corresponds to a vocabulary item (of category S0 or N0), τ ∈ {<,>} and σ ∈ {f, l}.
Finally, to avoid clutter, we may take the =-subscripts as understood, e.g., writing [e]
instead of [e]=. Thus, the final collection of operators is
〈e〉, [e], {e}, {e}τ , {eσ }, {eσ }τ ,
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Let us take stock. In Section 2, we proposed truth-conditions for a range of sentences
involving temporal prepositions and the order-denoting adjectives first and last. By treating
sentence-meanings as temporal abstracts, we showed how temporal preposition-phrases
could be viewed (semantically) as modal operators. In this section, we have formalized the
English fragment we are working with using a context-free grammar. We observed that
the phrase-structures which this grammar associates with the sentences it recognizes can
be re-arranged as formulas of a language whose syntax resembles propositional dynamic
logic. Of course, the point of this re-arrangement is that the resulting formulas can be given
a formal semantics which reproduce the truth-conditions proposed in Section 2. It is to that
task we now turn.
4. The temporal logic
In the sequel, let E be a fixed infinite set. We refer to elements of E as event-atoms.
Definition 1. Let e range over the set E of event-atoms. We define the categories of event-
relation α, T PL-formula φ and T PL+-formula ψ as follows:
α := e | ef | el;
φ := 〈e〉 | ¬〈e〉 | 〈e〉φ | [e]φ | {α}φ | {α}>φ | {α}<φ | φ ∧ φ′ | φ ∨ φ′;
ψ :=  | ¬ψ | 〈e〉ψ | [e]ψ | {α}ψ | {α}>ψ | {α}<ψ | ψ ∧ψ ′ | ψ ∨ψ ′.
It is easy to see that the syntax of T PL matches that of the English fragment T PE ex-
actly: T PL-formulas simply are phrase-structures in T PE and vice-versa. The language
T PL+ is a slight extension of T PL in which negation is applied rather more freely. Of
course, the real object of study is T PL, not T PL+. The latter is introduced only for the
purpose of simplifying the proofs of Section 5.
When dealing with T PL+, we avail ourselves of the Boolean connectives →, ↔ and ⊥,
understood as abbreviations in the usual way. Our first task is to give a formal semantics for
T PL+, and show that, for the fragment T PL, these semantics generate the satisfaction-
conditions proposed in Section 2.
Recall from Section 1 that I denotes the set of intervals, where an interval is a closed,
bounded, convex (non-empty) subset of R. Recall also the partial functions init(J, I ) and
fin(J, I ) defined on I .
Definition 2. A T PL+-interpretation A (henceforth: interpretation) is a finite subset of
I ×E. For any J ∈ I , we write A(J ) for {e ∈ E | 〈J, e〉 ∈A}, and for any e ∈ E, we write
A(e) for {J ∈ I | 〈J, e〉 ∈A}.
Think of an entry 〈J, e〉 in an interpretation A as representing the occurrence of an
event of type e over the interval J . The motivation for insisting that interpretations are
finite sets is simply that we have in mind situations in which event-atoms denote everyday
event-types instantiated in finite contexts.
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stipulations about the meanings of the words first and last applied to event-types of which
there is no unambiguously first or last instance, we adopt the following terminology.
Definition 3. Let I be an interval and J ⊂ I , where J satisfies some property P . We say
that J = [a, b] is the minimal-first subinterval of I satisfying P just in case for every
J ′ = [a′, b′] ⊂ I satisfying P , either (i) b < b′ or (ii) b = b′ and a  a′. Likewise, we
say that J = [a, b] is the minimal-last subinterval of I satisfying P just in case for every
J ′ = [a′, b′] ⊂ I satisfying P , either (i) a > a′ or (ii) a = a′ and b b′.
Definition 4. Let α be an event-relation, A an interpretation, and I, J ∈ I . We define
A |=I,J α by cases as follows:
(1) A |=I,J e iff J ⊂ I and e ∈A(J );
(2) A |=I,J ef iff A |=I,J e and J is the minimal-first such interval;
(3) A |=I,J el iff A |=I,J e and J is the minimal-last such interval.
It is obvious that, since A is finite, if there exists any J ⊂ I such that 〈J, e〉 ∈A, then
the minimal-first and minimal-last such J exist and are unique.
We are now ready to give the satisfaction-conditions for formulas in T PL+.
Definition 5. Let φ be a formula, A an interpretation, and I ∈ I . We define A |=I φ recur-
sively as follows:
(1) A |=I 〈e〉ψ iff for some J , A |=I,J e and A |=J ψ ;
(2) A |=I [e]ψ iff for all J , A |=I,J e implies A |=J ψ ;
(3) A |=I {α}ψ iff there is a unique J ⊂ I such that A |=I,J α, and for that J , A |=J ψ ;
(4) A |=I {α}<ψ iff there is a unique J ⊂ I such that A |=I,J α, and for that J ,
A |=init(J,I ) ψ ;
(5) A |=I {α}>ψ iff there is a unique J ⊂ I such thatA |=I,J α, and for that J ,A |=fin(J,I )
ψ ;
(6) the usual rules for , ∧, ∨ and ¬.
If A |=I φ, we say that φ is true at I in A. For any set of formulas Φ , we write A |=I Φ if
A |=I φ for all φ ∈ Φ . If, for all A and I , A |=I Φ implies A |=I φ′, we say that Φ entails
φ′; and if φ is the sole element in Φ , we say that φ entails φ′. If φ and φ′ entail each other,
we say they are logically equivalent and write φ ≡ φ′. A set of formulas Φ is said to be
satisfiable if, for some A and I , A |=I Φ .
We remark that the condition in Definition 2 that interpretations are finite subsets of
I ×E is significant. For example, the T PL-formula 〈e〉 ∧ [e]〈e〉 is unsatisfiable.
Since any T PL-formula φ is just the phrase-structure of a T PE-sentence, the immedi-
ate question is whether the satisfaction-conditions assigned to φ in Definition 5 correctly
reproduce the meanings proposed in Section 2.
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the sentences (4)–(6), which we repeat here for convenience as
(48) An interrupt was received
(49) An interrupt was received during every cycle
(50) An interrupt was received during every cycle until the main process ran,
the respective phrase-structures
(51) 〈int-rec〉
(52) [cyc]〈int-rec〉
(53) {main}<[cyc]〈int-rec〉.
From Definition 5, we see that the satisfaction-conditions of these formulas correspond
exactly to those of the respective first-order formulas
(54) ∃J0(int-rec(J0)∧ J0 ⊂ I )
(55) ∀J1(cyc(J1)∧ J1 ⊂ I → ∃J0(int-rec(J0)∧ J0 ⊂ J1))
(56) ιJ2(main(J2)∧ J2 ⊂ I,∀J1( cyc(J1)∧ J1 ⊂ init(J2, I ) → ∃J0(int-rec(J0)∧ J0 ⊂ J1))).
But these are precisely the meanings proposed in (8)–(10). More generally, we took pains
in Section 2 to show that temporal preposition phrases could be regarded, semantically, as
modal operators, mapping one temporal abstract to another, and binding the free variable
in their arguments. The formal semantics of T PL reflect this observation. In particular, we
see how the various components of such a modal operator are contributed by the temporal
preposition and its complement. The appropriateness of the semantics for the modifiers ·f
and ·l and the Boolean connectives should be self-evident.
This concludes the first part of the paper. We have defined an English fragment, T PE ,
incorporating temporal prepositions and order-specifying adjectives. We have shown that
sentences in this fragment can be regarded as formulas in an interval temporal logic T PL,
with satisfaction-conditions matching the meanings which speakers of English assign to
them, modulo the various caveats and occasional stipulations mentioned in Section 2. In
particular, the problems of determining the satisfiability of a set of sentences or the valid-
ity of an argument in T PE are identical to the corresponding problems in T PL. In the
second part of this paper, we proceed to determine the computational complexity of these
problems.
5. Upper complexity bound
The aim of this section is to show that the satisfiability problem for T PL+ (and hence
T PL) is in NEXPTIME. This is achieved by establishing an exponential bound on the size
of satisfying interpretations.
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¬〈e〉φ ≡ [e]¬φ ¬[e]φ ≡ 〈e〉¬φ
¬{e}φ ≡ ¬{e} ∨ {e}¬φ ¬{eσ }φ ≡ [e]⊥ ∨ {eσ }¬φ
¬{e}τ φ ≡ ¬{e} ∨ {e}τ¬φ ¬{eσ }τ φ ≡ [e]⊥ ∨ {eσ }τ¬φ.
Proof. Trivial.
Lemma 2. Every T PL+-formula is logically equivalent to one in which ¬ appears only
in subformulas of the forms ¬{e} and ⊥ (= ¬).
Proof. The logical equivalences of Lemma 1, together with familiar propositional validi-
ties, allow negations to be moved successively inwards until the desired form is reached.
Definition 6. Let A = ∅ be an interpretation. The depth of A is the greatest m for which
there exist J1 ⊃ · · · ⊃ Jm with A(Ji) = ∅ for all i (1 i m). If A is empty, we take its
depth to be 0.
The next lemma shows that, in determining satisfiability of T PL+-formulas, we need
never consider very deep interpretations. To illustrate the basic idea, let I1 ⊃ · · · ⊃ I4 be
a descending chain of intervals, and let A be the interpretation {〈Ii, a〉 | 1  i  4}, as
shown in the left-hand diagram in Fig. 5. Evidently, for any I ⊃ I1, A |=I 〈a〉 ∧ ¬{a}.
However, it is clear that we can remove the occurrence of a at I1 (indeed, also at I2) without
compromising this fact. Thus, if A∗ is the interpretation {〈Ii, a〉 | 2  i  4} depicted in
the right-hand diagram of Fig. 5, we still have, for any I ⊃ I1, A∗ |=I 〈a〉 ∧ ¬{a}.
Lemma 3. Let φ be a T PL+-formula, A an interpretation and I an interval such that
A |=I φ. Denote the number of symbols in φ by |φ|. Then there exists an interpretation
A∗ ⊆A with depth at most O(|φ|2) such that A∗ |=I φ.
Proof. We may assume that φ has the form guaranteed by Lemma 2, and further, that A
involves no event-atoms not mentioned in φ. Let Φ be the set of subformulas of φ. For
every event-atom e mentioned in φ and every interval J , define
L(J ) = {ψ ∈ Φ |A |=J ψ}
Le(J ) = L(J ) \
⋃{
L(K) | K ⊂ J,K ∈A(e)}.
Fig. 5. Two interpretations making 〈a〉 ∧ ¬{a} true at any I ⊃ I1.
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subformulas which are true at some proper subinterval of J satisfying e. Say that a pair
〈J, e〉 ∈A is redundant if Le(J ) = ∅ and there exist K,K ′ ∈A(e) such that K ⊂ K ′ ⊂ J .
Now set
A∗ =A \ {〈J, e〉 | 〈J, e〉 is redundant}.
To illustrate, suppose for the moment that φ is 〈a〉∧¬{a} and A the interpretation de-
picted in the left-hand diagram of Fig. 5. It is routine to check that L(I1) = L(I2), whence
La(I1) = ∅. On the other hand, La(I2), La(I3) and La(I4) are all non-empty, so that A∗ is
as depicted in the right-hand diagram of Fig. 5. As we observed, the reduction of A to A∗
does not affect the truth-value of φ at any interval I ⊃ I1.
Returning to the general case, it is obvious that, if J ⊂ J ′ with J,J ′ ∈A(e), then Le(J )
and Le(J ′) are disjoint. It follows that the depth of A∗ is bounded by m(m′ + 2), where
m is the number of event-atoms occurring in φ and m′ the number of subformulas of φ. It
thus suffices to show that, for all I and all ψ ∈ Φ , A |=I ψ implies A∗ |=I ψ .
We proceed by induction on the complexity of ψ . The base cases are of the forms ψ =
,⊥,¬{e}. The first two of these are trivial. For the case ψ = ¬{e}, suppose A |=I ψ .
If there is no J ⊂ I with J ∈ A(e), then since A∗ ⊆ A, we certainly have A∗ |=I ψ .
Otherwise, there exist J ⊂ I and J ′ ⊂ I with J = J ′ and J,J ′ ∈ A(e). If neither of the
pairs 〈J, e〉 and 〈J ′, e〉 is redundant, then J,J ′ ∈ A∗(e). On the other hand, if 〈J, e〉 is
redundant, there must exist K ⊂ K ′ ⊂ J such that the pairs 〈K,e〉 and 〈K ′, e〉 are non-
redundant elements of A, whence K,K ′ ∈ A∗(e); and similarly if 〈J ′, e〉 is redundant.
Either way, then, A∗ |=I ψ .
The recursive cases are of the forms ψ = [e]θ , 〈e〉θ , {α}θ , {α}τ θ , where α is of the forms
e, ef or el , and τ ∈ {<,>}. For the case ψ = [e]θ , we need only observe that A∗ ⊆ A.
For the case ψ = 〈e〉θ , suppose A |=I ψ . Then there exists J ⊂ I such that J ∈ A(e)
and A |=J θ . By the finiteness of A, choose such a J which is minimal under the order
⊂, so that J ∈ A∗(e). By inductive hypothesis, A∗ |=J θ ; hence A∗ |=I ψ . For the case
ψ = {e}θ , suppose A |=I ψ . Then there exists a unique J ⊂ I such that J ∈A(e); and for
this J , A |=J θ . In particular, there is no K ⊂ J such that K ∈A(e), whence J ∈A∗(e).
By inductive hypothesis and the fact that A∗ ⊆ A, we then easily have A∗ |=I ψ . The
remaining cases are dealt with exactly as for ψ = {e}θ , noting, in particular, thatA |=I,J ef
implies A∗ |=I,J ef and A |=I,J el implies A∗ |=I,J el . (This is the point at which we rely
on the rather artificial choice of semantics for ef and el in Definition 4 in cases where there
is no unambiguous first or last e-interval.)
Theorem 1. Let φ be a formula of T PL+. If φ is satisfiable, then φ is satisfied in an
interpretation of size bounded by 2p(|φ|), for some fixed polynomial p.
Proof. Suppose that A |=I0 φ. We may assume that φ has the form guaranteed by
Lemma 2; and by Lemma 3, we may assume that the depth of A is at most of order |φ|2.
As before, let Φ be the set of subformulas of φ. Say that a formula χ ∈ Φ is basic if the
major connective of χ is neither ∧ nor ∨. For any interval I and any ψ ∈ Φ , denote by
S(ψ, I) the set of all maximal basic subformulas χ of ψ such that A |=I χ . It is easy to
see that, for any ψ ∈ Φ and I ∈ I with A |=I ψ , S(ψ, I) entails ψ .
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Choose some object v0, and set
Q = V = {v0}; λ(v0) = I0; L(v0) = S(φ, I0); E = ∅.
until Q = ∅ do
Select v ∈ Q, set I := λ(v), and set Q := Q \ {v}.
for every ψ ∈ L(v), do
(1) If ψ = 〈e〉θ , let J be such that A |=I,J e and A |=J θ . Select w /∈ V and set λ(w) := J ; L(w) :=
S(θ, J ); Q := Q∪ {w}; V := V ∪ {w}; E := E ∪ {(v,w)}. Execute univ(w).
(2) If ψ = {α}θ , let J be such that A |=I,J α. Select w /∈ V and set λ(w) := J ; L(w) := S(θ, J ); Q :=
Q∪ {w}; V := V ∪ {w}; E := E ∪ {(v,w)}. Execute univ(w).
(3) If ψ = {α}<θ , let J be such that A |=I,J α and let J ′ = init(J, I ). Select w,w′ /∈ V and set
λ(w) := J ; λ(w′) := J ′; L(w) := ∅; L(w′) := S(θ, J ′); Q := Q ∪ {w,w′}; V := V ∪ {w,w′};
E := E ∪ {(v,w), (v,w′)}. Execute univ(w) and univ(w′).
(4) If ψ is {α}>θ , proceed symmetrically.
(5) If ψ is ¬{e}, and there exist J ⊂ I , J ′ ⊂ I with J = J ′ and J,J ′ ∈ A(e), choose any such J,J ′ .
Select w,w′ /∈ V and set λ(w) := J ; λ(w′) := J ′; L(w) := ∅; L(w′) := ∅; Q := Q ∪ {w,w′}; V :=
V ∪ {w,w′}; E := E ∪ {(v,w), (v,w′)}. Execute univ(w) and univ(w′).
end for every
end until
end tree
begin univ(u)
for every formula [e′]θ ∈ Φ such that 〈λ(u), e′〉 ∈A and there
exists L ⊃ λ(u) with A |=L [e′]θ do
Set L(u) := L(u)∪ S(θ,λ(u)).
end for every
end univ
Fig. 6. Construction of small interpretations in T PL+ .
We now construct a sub-interpretation A∗ of A, starting with the interval I0 and
choosing witnesses, tableau-style, for formulas in Φ . More specifically, the procedure
tree(φ, I0) in Fig. 6 grows a labelled tree with nodes V , edges E, and the two la-
bellings λ :V → I and L :V → P(Φ); the interpretation A∗ will then be extracted from
A using this labelled tree. For v ∈ V , think of λ(v) as the interval represented by v,
and think of L(v) as some collection of formulas which must all be true at this inter-
val. The variable Q is simply a queue of nodes in V awaiting processing. Steps 1–5
ensure, roughly, that ‘existential’ formulas in Φ have witnesses as required; the embed-
ded calls to univ(u) ensure that ‘universal’ formulas in Φ are not falsified by these
witnesses. A straightforward check shows that the invariant A |=λ(v) L(v) for all v ∈ V
is maintained by tree(φ, I0). Note that the function λ is not required to be 1–1. Note
also that the individual steps in tree(φ, I0) need not be effective: all we require for the
proof of the theorem is the existence of the interpretation A∗ with the advertised proper-
ties.
We claim that tree(φ, I0) terminates after finitely many iterations, and that, upon
termination, the tree (V ,E) satisfies the size bound of the Theorem. By inspection of
steps 1–5, whenever an edge (v,w) is added to E, we have λ(w) ⊂ λ(v). Therefore, at any
point in the execution of tree(φ, I0), if the tree (V ,E) contains a path v0 → ·· · → vm,
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univ(vi+1) adds material to L(vi+1). By inspection of univ, this can certainly happen
only if, for at least one event-atom e′, e′ ∈ A(λ(vi+1)). Therefore, it can happen for at
most D different values of i, where D is the depth of A. Moreover, any call to univ(vi+1)
adds at most |φ|2 symbols to L(vi+1); and if the call to univ(vi+1) adds no material to
L(vi+1), then L(vi+1) contains strictly fewer symbols than L(vi). Since D is at most of
order |φ|2, the length of the path v0 → ·· · → vm is therefore at most of order |φ|4. The
bound on the eventual size of V then follows from the fact that the out-degree of any node
in V is bounded by 2|φ|.
Now letA∗ = {〈J, e〉 ∈A | for some v ∈ V , J = λ(v)}. Evidently, |A∗| satisfies the size
bound of the theorem; it thus suffices to show thatA∗ |=I0 φ. In fact, we show by structural
induction that, for any node v ∈ V and any formula ψ , ψ ∈ L(v) implies A∗ |=λ(v) ψ .
Denote λ(v) by I . (Hence A |=I L(v).) The base cases are of the forms ψ = ,⊥,¬{e}.
The case ψ =  is trivial. For the case ψ = ⊥, the fact that A |=I L(v) ensures that
ψ /∈ L(v). For the case ψ = ¬{e}, if ψ ∈ L(v), A |=I L(v) ensures that either (i) there
is no J ⊂ I such that J ∈ A(e) or (ii) there exist J ⊂ I , J ′ ⊂ I with J = J ′ such that
J,J ′ ∈A(e). In the former case, since A∗ ⊆A, then A∗ |=I ψ . In the latter case, step 5
of tree(φ, I0) ensures that, for some such J,J ′, we have w,w′ ∈ V with λ(w) = J
and λ(w′) = J ′; hence J,J ′ ∈ A∗(e) and A∗ |=I ψ . The inductive cases are almost as
straightforward:
(1) Suppose ψ is 〈e〉θ . If ψ ∈ L(v), then, by step 1 of tree(φ, I0), there exists w ∈ V
and J ⊂ I such that λ(w) = J , S(θ, J ) ⊆ L(w), 〈J, e〉 ∈A, andA |=J θ . By inductive
hypothesis, A∗ |=J S(θ, J ), and since A |=J θ , S(θ, J ) entails θ , whence A∗ |=J θ .
By construction, 〈J, e〉 ∈A∗. Hence, ψ ∈ L(v) implies A∗ |=I ψ .
(2) Suppose ψ is [e]θ . If ψ ∈ L(v), then A |=I ψ . Consider any J ⊂ I with J ∈A∗(e).
Certainly, then, J ∈ A(e); hence A |=J θ , so that S(θ, J ) entails θ . Moreover, by
the construction of A∗ there exists w ∈ V with λ(w) = J , in which case the call
to univ(w) ensures that S(θ, J ) ⊆ L(w). By inductive hypothesis, A∗ |=J S(θ, J ),
whence A∗ |=J θ . Hence, ψ ∈ L(v) implies A∗ |=I ψ .
(3) The remaining cases are handled similarly to Case 1, or are trivial.
Corollary 1. The satisfiability problem for T PL+ is in NEXPTIME.
Proof. Let φ be a formula of T PL+, and let d be the maximum depth of nesting of modal
operators in φ. By Theorem 1, if φ is satisfiable, then it is satisfiable in an interpretation
whose size is bounded by some fixed exponential function of |φ|. Guess such an interpre-
tation A and an interval I . Let J0 be the set of intervals mentioned in A together with I ,
and for any i  0, let Ji+1 be Ji together with all intervals expressible as init(J0, J ) or
fin(J0, J ), where J0 ∈ J0 and J ∈ Ji . Now, for all i (0 i  d) and all J ∈ Jd−i , guess
which subformulas of φ having modal depth i are true at J in A. It is then straightforward
to check, in time bounded by some fixed exponential function of |φ|, that these guesses are
correct, and thence to determine whether A |=I φ.
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nature of T PL+, which we observed in Section 2.1, together with the assumption that only
finitely many events occur in a bounded time-interval. Note that the construction employed
in the proof of Theorem 1 does not, as formulated there, constitute a tableau decision
procedure for T PL+, because the steps are not necessarily effective. We remark that a
(non-terminating) tableau procedure has been devised for the interval temporal logic CDT,
interpreted over branching-time structures [7]. It is not immediately clear whether such an
approach could be adapted to yield a terminating procedure for T PL+, interpreted over a
linear time flow, and incorporating the assumption that only finitely many events can occur
over a bounded time-interval. However, the results of the next section indicate that any
such tableau method is likely to require extensive backtracking.
6. Lower complexity bound
In this section, we show that the satisfiability problem for T PL (and hence T PL+) is
NEXPTIME-hard. Denote by Nn the natural numbers less than n. Define an exponential
tiling problem to be a triple (C,H,V ), where C = {c0, . . . , cM−1} is a set and H and
V are binary relations over C. We call the elements of C colours, and we call H and
V the horizontal constraints and the vertical constraints, respectively. An instance of
(C,H,V ) is a list c′0, . . . , c′n−1 of elements of C (repetitions allowed). Such an instance
is positive if there exists a function τ :N2n × N2n → C such that: (i) τ(i,0) = c′i for all
i (0  i  n − 1); (ii) 〈τ(i, j), τ (i + 1, j)〉 ∈ H for all i, j (0  i < 2n − 1,0  j 
2n − 1); (iii) 〈τ(i, j), τ (i, j + 1)〉 ∈ V for all i, j (0 i  2n − 1,0 j < 2n − 1); and (iv)
τ(0,2n − 1) = c0. We refer to τ as a tiling. Intuitively, the elements of C represent colours
of unit square tiles which must be arranged so as to fill a grid of 2n × 2n squares, with the
top left-hand square required to have the colour c0. The constraints H (respectively, V )
list which colours are allowed to go to the right of (respectively, above) which others. The
problem instance c′0, . . . , c′n−1 lists the colours of the first n tiles in the bottom row. For a
discussion of exponential tiling problems, see [2, Section 6.1.1].
To show that a problem P is NEXPTIME-hard, it suffices to show that, for any exponen-
tial tiling problem (C,H,V ), any instance of (C,H,V ) may be encoded, in polynomial
time, as an instance of P . We now proceed to do this where P is T PL-satisfiability. The
main technical challenge is to encode, using a succinct formula of T PL, the information
that there are exactly 22n pairwise disjoint intervals satisfying some event-atom t within
a given interval I ∗. We begin by tackling this problem; the remainder of the reduction is
routine.
6.1. Fixing a large number of tiles
Let m  2 and let a0, a01, . . . , a0m+1, a11, . . . , a1m+1 and z be pairwise distinct event-
atoms. To simplify the notation, we write a0 alternatively as a00 or a
1
0 . The event-atom z will
always function as a harmless ‘dummy’; it occurs in subformulas 〈z〉 whose only purpose
is to ensure that we remain inside the temporal logic T PL, rather than the more general
T PL+. The following terminology will be used to aid readability. Where an interpretation
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A is clear from context, we say that an interval I satisfies an event-atom e if 〈I, e〉 ∈ A;
alternatively, we say that I is an e-interval.
Define ψ1 to be the conjunction of the following formulas, where 0  i  m and 0 
h 1:
(57) {a0}〈z〉, [ahi ]{a0i+1}>〈a1i+1〉, [ahi ]{a1i+1}〈z〉.
Let A be an interpretation and I ∗ an interval such that A |=I∗ ψ1. For all i (0  i  m),
define an i-witness inductively as follows:
(1) I is a 0-witness if and only if I is the unique proper subinterval of I ∗ satisfying a0.
(2) J is an (i + 1)-witness if and only if there exists an i-witness I such that J is either
the unique proper subinterval of I satisfying a0i+1 or the unique proper subinterval of
I satisfying a1i+1.
Given that A |=I∗ ψ1, each i-witness I properly includes exactly one interval J satisfying
a0i+1 and exactly one interval J ′ satisfying a1i+1, with J preceding J ′. Thus, there are
exactly 2i i-witnesses for all i (1  i  m); moreover, these are pairwise disjoint and
alternate between intervals satisfying a0i and a1i , as depicted in Fig. 7. Note however that,
in general, the i-witnesses will be a subset of the subintervals of I ∗ satisfying a0i or a1i
in A.
The formula ψ1 thus provides a succinct way of guaranteeing that at least 2m−1 proper
subintervals of I ∗ satisfy a0m in A—viz, every other m-witness. A much greater challenge
is to write a succinct collection of formulas ensuring that no other proper subintervals of
I ∗ satisfy a0m. This task occupies the remainder of Section 6.1.
Let b1, . . . , bm, p00, . . . , p
0
m−1 and p10, . . . , p1m−1 be new event-atoms (i.e., pairwise dis-
tinct and distinct from z, a0 and the ahi ). Intuitively, the event-atoms bi will be used to
prevent ‘additional’ a0i -events and a
1
i -events slipping in between successive i-witnesses;
the event-atoms p0j and p1j will function as ‘nails’, holding the whole rickety structure to-
gether. Let ψ2 be the conjunction of the following formulas, where 0 i < m, 0 h 1
and 0 h′  1:
(58) [ah
′
i ]{bi+1}〈z〉, [ah
′
i ]{phi }〈z〉, [ahi+1]〈phi 〉,
[b ]〈ph〉, [ph]〈a1−h〉.i+1 i i i+2
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SupposeA |=I∗ ψ1 ∧ψ2. Formula ψ1 guarantees that, for all i (0 i < m), any subinterval
I ⊂ I ∗ satisfying either a0i or a1i properly includes a unique J satisfying a0i+1 and a unique
J ′ satisfying a1i+1, with J preceding J ′. Moreover, there exists a unique K ⊂ J satisfying
a1i+2, and a unique K ′ ⊂ J ′ satisfying a0i+2. In addition, ψ2 guarantees that I also properly
includes a unique L satisfying bi+1; moreover, the event-atoms p0i and p1i , which are
satisfied uniquely within I , effectively ‘nail’ the L, J , J ′, K and K ′ together so that L ∩
J ⊃ K and L ∩ J ′ ⊃ K ′. A representative situation conforming to these constraints is
depicted in Fig. 8(a).
Let q01 , . . . , q
0
m−1 and q11 , . . . , q1m−1 be new event-atoms, and let ψ3 be the conjunction
of the following formulas, where 1 i < m and 0 h 1:
(59)
[bi]{a1i+1}>〈a0i+1〉, [bi]{a0i+1}〈z〉, [bi]{bi+1}〈z〉,
[bi]{qhi }〈z〉, [bi+1]〈qhi 〉, [ahi+1]〈q1−hi 〉, [qhi ]〈a1−hi+2 〉.
Suppose A |=I∗ ψ1 ∧ ψ3. Looking at the first row of (59), ψ3 guarantees that, for all i
(1 i < m), any subinterval I ⊂ I ∗ satisfying bi properly includes a unique J satisfying
a1i+1 and a unique J ′ satisfying a
0
i+1 (with J preceding J ′), as well as a unique L satisfying
bi+1. Further, ψ1 guarantees that there is a unique K ⊂ J satisfying a1i+2, and a unique
K ′ ⊂ J ′ satisfying a0i+2. Looking now at the second row of (59), the event-atoms q0i and q1i ,
which are satisfied uniquely within I , effectively ‘nail’ the L, J , J ′, K and K ′ together so
that L∩J ⊃ K and L∩J ′ ⊃ K ′. A representative situation conforming to these constraints
is depicted in Fig. 8(b).
These observations help us establish:
Claim 1. Let A |=I∗ ψ1 ∧ ψ2 ∧ ψ3, and let K , K ′ be consecutive (i + 1)-witnesses, with
0 i < m. Then there exists an interval L ⊂ I ∗ properly including both K and K ′, such
that L satisfies one of a0i , a1i or bi .
Proof. We proceed by induction on i. If i = 0, the result is trivial, because the only 1-
witnesses are by definition properly included in the 0-witness.
For the inductive case, suppose the statement of the lemma holds with 0 i < m − 1;
we show the same statement holds with i replaced by i + 1. Let K,K ′ be consecutive
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Each (i + 2)-witness is by definition properly included in a unique (i + 1)-witness; so let
J be the (i + 1)-witness such that K ⊂ J and J ′ be the (i + 1)-witness such that K ′ ⊂ J ′.
Since K and K ′ are consecutive, J and J ′ are identical or consecutive. In the former case,
we may put L = J = J ′, and L satisfies either a0i+1 or a1i+1 as required by the lemma. So
assume the latter. By inductive hypothesis, then, J and J ′ are properly included within an
interval I ⊂ I ∗ such that I satisfies a0i , a1i , or bi . Moreover, since K and K ′ are consecutive
but not included in a common (i + 1)-witness, K satisfies a1i+2 and K ′ satisfies a0i+2.
If I satisfies ah′i (0 h′  1), then ψ1 guarantees that I properly includes exactly one
interval satisfying a0i+1 and exactly one interval satisfying a1i+1, with the former preceding
the latter; these must be, respectively, J and J ′, therefore. Again by ψ1, J properly includes
exactly one interval satisfying a1i+2 and J ′ exactly one interval satisfying a
0
i+2; these must
be, respectively, K and K ′, therefore. Thus, we have the arrangement of Fig. 8(a). In par-
ticular, we have seen that ψ2 guarantees the existence of an interval L satisfying bi+1 and
properly including both K and K ′, as required by the lemma.
If I satisfies bi , then ψ3 guarantees that I properly includes exactly one interval satis-
fying a1i+1 and exactly one interval satisfying a
0
i+1, with the former preceding the latter;
these must be, respectively, J and J ′, therefore. By ψ1, J properly includes exactly one
interval satisfying a1i+2 and J ′ exactly one interval satisfying a
0
i+2; these must be, respec-
tively, K and K ′, therefore. Thus, we have the arrangement of Fig. 8(b). In particular, we
have seen that ψ3 guarantees the existence of an interval L satisfying bi+1 and properly
including both K and K ′, as required by the lemma.
Claim 2. LetA |=I∗ ψ1 ∧ψ2 ∧ψ3. If K and K ′ are consecutive i-witnesses (in that order),
with 1 i m, then no subinterval H ⊂ I ∗ satisfying either a0i or a1i can begin after K
begins and end before K ′ ends.
Proof. Suppose for contradiction that such an H exists. By Claim 1, we have some L ⊂ I ∗
satisfying one of a0i−1, a1i−1 or bi−1, with L ⊃ K and L ⊃ K ′. Thus, L ⊃ H . But ψ1 and
ψ3 contain conjuncts requiring L to properly include exactly one interval satisfying a0i and
exactly one interval satisfying a1i . Contradiction.
Let l1, . . . , lm, l′1, . . . , l′m+1 be new event-atoms, and let ψ
l
4 be the conjunction of the
following collection of formulas, where i (1 i m):
(60) {a0}〈l′1〉, {l′i}{a0i }〈l′i+1〉,
{l′i}{a0i }>〈li〉, {li}<{a0i }〈z〉, {li}<¬〈a1i 〉.
Suppose A |=I∗ ψ1 ∧ ψl4 and 1  i  m. For all i (1  i  m), let Ji be the first-
occurring i-witness, and let L′i be the unique proper subinterval of I ∗ satisfying l′i . Then
the conjuncts in the first row of (60) enforce the arrangement
L′1 ⊃ J1 ⊃ L′2 ⊃ J2 ⊃ · · · ⊃ L′m ⊃ Jm.
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Then the conjuncts in the second row of (60) ensure that Ji ends before Li begins, and,
moreover, Ji is the only subinterval of I ∗ satisfying either a0i or a1i which ends before Li
begins. In particular, no subinterval of I ∗ satisfying either a0i or a1i ends before Ji ends.
Symmetrically, let r1, . . . , rm, r ′1, . . . , r ′m+1 be new event-atoms, and let ψr4 be the con-junction of the following collection of formulas, where i (1 i m):
{a0}〈r ′1〉, {r ′i}{a1i }〈r ′i+1〉,
{r ′i}{a1i }<〈ri〉, {ri}>{a1i }〈z〉, {ri}>¬〈a0i 〉.
Let ψ4 be ψl4 ∧ψr4 . We thus have:
Claim 3. If A |=I∗ ψ1 ∧ ψ4 and 1 i m, then no subinterval of I ∗ satisfying either a0i
or a1i can end before the first i-witness ends or begin after the last i-witness begins.
We are now ready to achieve the main task of Section 6.1. Fix n > 0. Set m = 2n + 1,
let ψ1, . . . , ψ4 be as above, and let ψ5 be the conjunction of the following formulas, where
1 i m, 0 h 1 and 0 h′  1:
(61) [ahi ]¬〈ah
′
i 〉.
Claim 4. Let A |=I∗ ψ1 ∧ · · · ∧ ψ5. Then, for all i (0  i  m), there exist exactly 2i
proper subintervals of I ∗ satisfying either a0i or a1i . These intervals are arranged as in
Fig. 7. Hence, there are exactly 22n proper subintervals of I ∗ satisfying a0m.
Proof. Suppose 0 i m. Certainly, there are exactly 2i i-witnesses. It suffices to show
that no other proper subinterval of I ∗ satisfies a0i or a1i . Suppose, for contradiction, J ⊂ I ∗
and J satisfies ahi , but J is not an i-witness. By ψ5, J neither properly includes nor is
properly included in any i-witness. Hence, the following possibilities are exhaustive: (i)
J ends before the first i-witness ends; (ii) J begins after one i-witness begins and ends
before the next one ends; and (iii) J begins after the last i-witness begins. But Claims 2
and 3 rule out all these possibilities. Hence, all proper subintervals of I ∗ satisfying a0i or
a1i are i-witnesses.
As a final trick, we show how the 22n a0m-intervals identified in Claim 4 can be con-
secutively numbered. Let d01 , . . . , d
0
m−1, d11 , . . . , d1m−1 be new event-atoms. Think of d
h
i
(1 i m− 1, 0 h 1) as stating that the ith digit in a certain (m− 1)-digit binary nu-
meral is h, where the first digit is the most significant and the (m−1)th the least significant.
Let ψ6 be the conjunction of the following formulas, where 1 i < m and 0 h 1:
(62) [ahi ][a0m]〈dhi 〉, [a0m](¬〈d0i 〉 ∨ ¬〈d1i 〉).
Claim 5. Suppose A |=I∗ ψ1 ∧ψ6, and consider the 22n m-witnesses which satisfy a0m. Let
these intervals be numbered in order of temporal precedence as J0, . . . , J22n−1. For all k
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for k (counting the most significant as the first) by k[i]. Then we have:
k[i] =
{
1 iff A |=Jk 〈d1i 〉
0 iff A |=Jk 〈d0i 〉.
Proof. By formula ψ6 and inspection of Fig. 7.
Let us refer to the 22n a0m-intervals identified in Claim 4 as tiles, and let us write a0m
more suggestively as t . We continue to denote the tiles in order of temporal precedence as
J0, . . . , J22n−1, and we say that Jk (0  k < 22n) has index k. If J is any tile, denote its
index by kJ . In that case, Claim 5 lets us read A |=J 〈dhi 〉 as ‘saying’ that the ith digit in
the 2n-digit binary representation of kJ is h.
6.2. Organizing the tiles into a grid
Group the 22n tiles into 2n blocks, each containing 2n consecutive tiles. Regarding each
block as a row gives us a 2n × 2n grid. If J and J ′ are tiles, then J ′ lies immediately above
J in this grid in case kJ ′ = kJ + 2n; similarly, J ′ lies immediately to the right of J in the
grid in case kJ ′ = kJ + 1 and the last n bits of kJ are not all 1s. We now write formulas
ensuring that, for all tiles J , J ′ such that kJ ′ = kJ + 2n, we can identify an interval L such
that J is the first tile included in L and J ′ is the last.
Continuing to write m for 2n+ 1, let g01, . . . , g0m, g11, . . . , g1m, be new event-atoms, and
let ψ7 be the conjunction of the following formulas, where 0 i < m and 0 h 1:
(63) [ahi ]{g0i+1}>〈a0i+1〉, [ahi ]{g1i+1}<〈a0i+1〉, [ahi ]{g1i+1}>〈a1i+1〉.
Fig. 9 illustrates how the g0i+1- and g1i+1-intervals are arranged under an i-witness ifA |=I∗
ψ1 ∧ ψ7. It helps to think of the ghi -intervals as ‘short’ intervals separating consecutive i-
witnesses.
Now let f0, f 01 , . . . , f
0
2n, f
1
1 , . . . , f
1
2n be new event-atoms, write f
0 alternatively as f 00
or f 10 , and let ψ8 be the conjunction of the following formulas, where 0 i < 2n, 0 h
1 and 0 h′  1:
(64) 〈f0〉, [f h2n]〈ah2n〉, [f h2n]{(ah2n)f }<¬〈ah
′
2n+1〉,
[f hi ]{(ahi )f }<¬〈ah
′
i+1〉, [f hi ]{f h
′
i+1}<¬〈gh
′
i+1〉.
Fig. 9. Arrangement of g0
i
- and g1
i
-intervals within an i-witness (1 i m).
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To motivate this construction, it helps to imagine the f hi -intervals guaranteed by ψ8 as
distributed similarly to the corresponding ahi -intervals in Fig. 7, except that the end-point
of every f hi -interval is shifted right by a ‘large’ fixed amount—specifically, an amount
equal to the time occupied by 2n consecutive tiles. Fig. 10 illustrates how f hi - and f
h′
i+1-
intervals are arranged in such an interpretation.
Suppose A |=I∗ ψ1 ∧ · · · ∧ ψ8. Ignoring for the moment all intervals which are not
proper subintervals of I ∗, any f hi -interval (1  i  2n, 0  h  1) properly includes an
ahi -interval; and any f
h
i -interval (1 i < 2n, 0 h 1) properly includes a unique f 0i+1-
interval and a unique f 1i+1-interval. Now let k be an integer with 0 k < 2n, and denote
the 2n digits of k by k[i] (1 i  2n) as in Claim 5. Then we can form a chain of intervals
L1 ⊃ · · · ⊃ L2n such that, for all i (1  i  2n), Li is an f k[i]i -interval. Moreover, for
all i (1  i  2n), Li properly includes some ak[i]i -interval; so let Ki be the first such
interval. We claim that K1 ⊃ · · · ⊃ K2n. To see this, suppose 1 i < 2n, and write h for
k[i] and h′ for k[i + 1]. Let K be the unique ah′i+1-interval properly included in Ki . From
[f hi ]{(ahi )f }<¬〈ah
′
i+1〉, Li cannot include any ah
′
i+1-interval which finishes before the
start of Ki . By Claim 4 and inspection of Fig. 7, we see that K is therefore the first ah
′
i+1-
interval properly included in Li . From [f hi ]{f h
′
i+1}<¬〈gh
′
i+1〉, Li+1 starts before the start
of K , and, since it is an f h′i+1-interval, properly includes at least one a
h′
i+1-interval. It follows
that K is the first ah′i+1-interval properly included in Li+1: in other words, K = Ki+1. Thus,
Ki ⊃ Ki+1 as required. Hence we have:
Claim 6. Suppose A |=I∗ ψ1 ∧ · · · ∧ ψ8 and 0  k < 22n. Then there exists L ⊂ I such
that L is either an f 02n-interval or an f
1
2n-interval, and the first tile properly included in L
is Jk .
Proof. Consider the chain K1 ⊃ · · · ⊃ K2n constructed above. The first tile properly in-
cluded in L = L2n is properly included in K2n. The result follows from Claim 5.
In the sequel, we use v to denote either f 02n or f
1
2n indifferently. Thus, if A |=I∗ ψ1 ∧
· · ·∧ψ8, then there are at least 22n v-intervals properly included in I ∗—one ‘starting with’
each of the 22n tiles. We now proceed to ensure that, if L is a v-interval starting with tile
Jk , where 0 k < 22n −2n, then L includes exactly 2n +1 consecutive tiles. (See Fig. 11.)
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To aid readability, we occasionally employ T PL+-formulas in the sequel; their conversion
into logically equivalent T PL-formulas is completely routine.
As a preliminary, let d−, d∗1 , . . . , d∗2n be new event-atoms, and ψ9 be the conjunction of
the following formulas, where 1 i  n:
(65) [t](〈d−〉 ↔∨1jn〈d0j 〉), [t](〈d∗i 〉 ↔ (〈d0i 〉 ∧∧i<jn〈d1j 〉)).
The purpose of ψ9 is to enable us to simulate addition of 2n to binary numerals representing
integers less than 22n − 2n. Suppose A |=I∗ ψ1 ∧ · · · ∧ψ9. Then it is routine to check that:
(i) for any tile J , A |=J 〈d−〉 if and only if kJ is in the range 0  kJ < 22n − 2n; (ii)
for any tile J with 0  kJ < 22n − 2n, A |=J 〈d∗i 〉 if and only if i is the least integer
such that the j th digit in the 2n-digit binary representation of kJ is 1 for all j in the range
i < j  n. With this interpretation in mind, let ψ10 be the conjunction of the following
formulas, where 1 i  n:
(66) ∧1in[v]({tf }〈d∗i 〉 → {t l}(∧i<jn〈d0j 〉 ∧ 〈d1i 〉)),∧
1in
∧
1j<i[v]
({tf }〈d∗i 〉 → ({tf }〈d1j 〉 ↔ {t l}〈d1j 〉)),∧
n<j2n[v]
({tf }〈d−〉 → ({tf }〈d1j 〉 ↔ {t l}〈d1j 〉)).
If A |=I∗ ψ1 ∧ · · ·∧ψ10, then we can read ψ10 as stating that, for every subinterval L ⊂ I ∗
satisfying v, if the first tile included in L has index less than 22n − 2n, then the indices of
the first and last tiles included in L differ by precisely 2n. Pictorially, we have the arrange-
ment of v-intervals shown in Fig. 11. The corresponding formulas ψ11, . . . ,ψ14 required
to establish a suitable arrangement of event-types h encoding horizontal neighbourhood
are analogous and need not be spelled out here.
6.3. Encoding tiling problems
We are now ready to prove the main result of this section.
Theorem 2. The satisfiability problem for T PL is NEXPTIME-hard.
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size n. Construct the formulas ψ1, . . . ,ψ14 as above. If C = {c0, . . . , cM−1}, take the cj
(0 j <M) to be event-atoms, and let ψT be the conjunction of the following two formu-
las:
[t]
∨
0j<M
〈cj 〉, [t]
∧
0j<j ′<M
(¬〈cj 〉 ∨ ¬〈cj ′ 〉).
Given a tile J , we regard the satisfaction of an event-atom cj by a proper subinterval of J
as indicating that the tile J is coloured by cj . The formula ψT simply states that each tile
has exactly one colour chosen from C.
Let ψH be the conjunction of the following formulas, where (ci, cj ) /∈ H :
[h]({tf }¬〈ci〉 ∨ {t l}¬〈cj 〉).
Let ψV be the conjunction of the following formulas, where (ci, cj ) /∈ V :
[v]({tf }¬〈ci〉 ∨ {t l}¬〈cj 〉).
The motivation for ψH and ψV should be obvious. Finally, we encode the fact that the
initial tile J0 is required to have colour c′0 using the formula
〈t〉(〈d00 〉 ∧ · · · ∧ 〈d02n〉 ∧ 〈c′0〉),
and similarly for the other tiles which are required to have a particular colour. Denote the
conjunction of all these formulas by ψI . From the above constructions, it is routine to
verify that the instance c′0, . . . , c′n−1 of (C,H,V ) is positive if and only if
ψ1 ∧ · · · ∧ψ14 ∧ψT ∧ψH ∧ψV ∧ψI
is satisfiable. This completes the reduction.
Corollary 2. The satisfiability problems for T PL and T PL+ are NEXPTIME-complete.
Actually, a glance at the proof of Theorem 2 reveals that it shows a little more. The
satisfiability problem for the fragment of T PL in which the modal depth of formulas is
limited to 3 is still NEXPTIME-hard, since only formulas from this fragment were used to
encode instances of tiling problems. The fact that only very simple T PL-formulas figure
in this proof is crucial for the argument of Section 6.4.
6.4. Linguistic considerations
We have now established that satisfiability in T PL is NEXPTIME-complete. Since
T PL closely matches our English fragment T PE , we are close to answering the question
with which we began: What is the computational complexity of determining logical re-
lationships between sentences employing the temporal constructions featured in sentences
such as (1)–(3)? However, one small matter remains. It should be obvious that the grammar
of T PE , restricted as it is, accepts strings whose status as English sentences—on syntac-
tic, semantic or pragmatic grounds—is doubtful. What we require, then, is an assurance
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complexity result.
At first sight, this seems an impossible demand, since we cannot know in advance
what refinements might be made to our English grammar. However, it turns out that the
proof strategy employed above yields an easy solution. Obviously, eliminating marginal or
awkward sentences from T PE can only cause the fragment to contract, and so cannot in-
crease the computational complexity of its satisfiability problem. The only possibility we
must guard against is that such a contraction might invalidate the NEXPTIME-hardness
result. And this is where the details of the proof of that result come to our rescue. For
that proof depends on the encoding of tiling problems by the formulas ψ1–ψ14, ψT , ψH ,
ψV and ψI . All we need do then is examine these formulas one by one and check that
they can be generated, using the grammar presented above, by good, idiomatic English
sentences. If so, we know that any linguistically motivated restrictions on T PL will still
include these sentences, and will assign them the advertised satisfaction-conditions. Thus,
the NEXPTIME-completeness result will still apply to any linguistically motivated tight-
ening of the grammar.
The formulas ψ1–ψ3, given in (57)–(59), consist of conjuncts of the forms
{a0}〈z〉, [ahi+1]〈phi 〉, [ahi ]{a0i+1}>〈a1i+1〉, [ahi ]{a1i+1}〈z〉.
But these formulas express the meanings of the unobjectionable T PE-sentences
(67) During the occurrence of a0, z occurred
(68) During every occurrence of ahi+1, phi occurred
(69) During every occurrence of ahi , a1i+1 occurred after the occurrence
of a0i+1
(70) During every occurrence of ahi , z occurred during the occurrence of a1i+1.
For added naturalness, we have fronted one preposition-phrase in each of these sentences;
this facility could easily be incorporated into our grammar, of course.
Formula ψl4, given in (60), additionally involves conjuncts of the forms
{l′i}{a0i }〈l′i+1〉, {l′i}{a0i }>〈li〉, {li}<¬〈a1i 〉, {li}<{a0i }〈z〉;
these formulas express the meanings of the unobjectionable T PE-sentences
(71) During the occurrence of l′i , l′i+1 occurred while a0i occurred
(72) During the occurrence of l′i , li occurred after a0i occurred
(73) a1i did not occur before li occurred
(74) Before li occurred, z occurred during the occurrence of a0i .
Formulas ψ5 and ψ6, given in (61)–(62), additionally involve conjuncts of the forms
[ahi ]¬〈ah
′
i 〉, [ahi ][a0m]〈dhi 〉, [a0m]
(¬〈d0i 〉 ∨ ¬〈d1i 〉);
these are generated by the unobjectionable T PE-sentences
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i did not occur
(76) During every occurrence of ahi , dhi occurred during every occurrence of a0m
(77) During every occurrence of a0m, either d0i did not occur or d1i did not occur.
For added naturalness, we have helped ourselves to the word either, which could be easily
incorporated into our grammar.
Formula ψ7, given in (63), presents no new difficulties. Formula ψ8, given in (64),
additionally involves conjuncts of the forms
〈f0〉, [f hi ]{(ahi )f }<¬〈ah
′
i+1〉, [f hi ]{f h
′
i+1}<¬〈gh
′
i+1〉;
these are generated by the unobjectionable T PE-sentences
(78) f0 occurred
(79) During every occurrence of f hi , ah
′
i+1 did not occur before the first occurrence of a
h
i
(80) During every occurrence of f hi , gh
′
i+1 did not occur before the occurrence of f
h′
i+1.
In the presence of the preceding formulas, formula ψ9, given in (65), can be equivalently
expressed as a conjunction of formulas of the forms
[t](¬〈e0〉 ∨ 〈e1〉 ∨ · · · ∨ 〈el〉), [t](〈e0〉 ∨ 〈e1〉 ∨ · · · ∨ 〈el〉),
for various collections of event-atoms e0, . . . , el ; these correspond to the T PE-sentences
(81) During every occurrence of t either e0 did not occur or e1 occurred or . . . or el occurred
(82) During every occurrence of t either e0 occurred or . . . or el occurred.
These sentences are certainly grammatical. Admittedly, huge disjunctions might be said
not to belong to English as she is spoken; however, it is a simple matter to convert the
relevant formulas equisatisfiably into formulas where disjunctions involve no more than
three disjuncts, thus avoiding even this degree of unnaturalness. Formulas ψ10–ψ14, ψT ,
ψH , ψV and ψI present no new difficulties. We conclude that no linguistically motivated
tightening of our fragment T PE could change the above complexity result. Determining
the satisfiability of sets of sentences featuring the temporal constructions studied in this
paper is indeed NEXPTIME-complete.
7. Conclusion
In this paper, we defined the fragment of temporal English T PE , together with a match-
ing interval temporal logic T PL. The satisfiability problem for T PL was shown to be
complete for the complexity class NEXPTIME. In view of the intimate connection between
T PE and T PL, we take this result to indicate the complexity of performing logical de-
ductions in the fragment of temporal English in question, and thus to give a rough measure
of the expressive resources which the grammatical constructions it features—primarily,
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poral logics, T PL has low complexity. In the search for logics of limited expressive
power, fragments owing their salience to the syntax of natural language are a good place
to look.
We endeavoured throughout to be faithful to the facts of English usage while retaining
a reasonably perspicuous formal system, amenable to mathematical analysis. These two
aims are to some extent antagonistic, of course. Natural languages are products of human
biology and human civilization, and as such do not always admit of a comfortable mathe-
matical description. Thus, even the simple fragment of English considered here skirts many
delicate issues of syntax, and includes sentences about whose exact semantics even native
speakers are uncertain. In this situation, we have occasionally had to legislate, sometimes
in whatever way is mathematically most convenient. Nevertheless, while faithfulness to
the linguistic data is a virtue, it is all too easy, in pursuit of this virtue, to lose sight of the
remarkable logical regularity of the constructions studied here; and it is this regularity that
has been the focus of our attention. To what extent this analysis can be usefully extended
to cover other temporal constructions in English (and other natural languages), and what
effects such extensions will have on the complexity of satisfiability in the accompanying
logic, remain open.
Appendix A. The grammar rules for T PE
Syntax
S → S, PP
S → S, Conj, S
S → S0
S → Neg, S0
S1D → S0
S1! → S0, OAdv
NPD → DetD , N1D
N1D → N0
N1! → OAdj, N0
PP → PN,D , NPD
PP → PS,D , S1D
Open-class lexicon
S0 → an interrupt was received/int-rec
S0 → the main process ran/main
. . .
N0 → cycle/cyc
N0 → run of the main process/main
. . .
Closed-class lexicon
Det∀ → every/[ ]
Det∃ → some/〈 〉
Det! → the/{ }
Neg → not/¬
Conj → and/∧
Conj → or/∨
OAdj → first/f
OAdj → last/l
PN,D → during/=
PN,! → until/<
PN,! → before/<
PN,! → after/>
OAdv → for the first time/f
OAdv → for the last time/l
PS,! → while/(=, { })
PS,! → when/(=, { })
PS,∀ → whenever/(=, [ ])
PS,! → until/(<, { })
PS,! → before/(<, { })
PS,! → after/(>, { }).
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